Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 12
Number 2 2019

Article 9

12-31-2019

Guffey v. Lexington House
Adam Laliberte

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
Adam Laliberte, Guffey v. Lexington House, 12 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2019)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol12/iss2/9

This Civil Law in Louisiana is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

THE CLAIM GAME: THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S
DISCUSSION OF A PROPER MEDICAL REVIEW CLAIMANT
IN GUFFEY V. LEXINGTON HOUSE
Adam Laliberte*
I. Introduction...........................................................................349
II. Background..........................................................................350
III. Decision of the Court ..........................................................352
IV. Commentary .......................................................................353
Keywords: medical review panel, medical malpractice, Medical
Malpractice Act, claimant, succession representative, wrongful
death, survival action
I. INTRODUCTION
“I will keep them from harm and injustice.” This classic iteration of the Hippocratic Oath is one of the duties that doctors hold
themselves to when treating a sick or ailing patient.1 Indeed, we all
go to the doctor’s office with an aspiration for adequate treatment
and a hope that our doctors and caretakers will perform our treatments smoothly. In the unfortunate circumstance of a doctor’s
wrongdoing, however, certain protocols must be followed to remedy the injured patient’s harm. A recent decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court calls into question the correct method to cure such
an injustice. When a patient has suffered injury or death as a result
of medical malpractice by his or her doctor or caretaker, the litigants to the suit must file a medical review panel claim to deter*
J.D. Candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
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1. William C. Shiel, Jr., Medical Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINENET, https://perma.cc/4ZG8-ULZW.
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mine whether the doctor breached his or her standard of care. The
Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent holding in Guffey v. Lexington
House2 limited the class of persons eligible to file this crucial step
in the litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (the “Act”), in
order to bring a claim for medical malpractice, a patient or their
representative must file a claim for a medical review panel before
filing the suit.3 Louisiana courts have established that “[a] request
for a medical review panel is a prerequisite to and not the equivalent of a suit for medical malpractice.”4 The panel is a body of experts who evaluate a medical claim and provide an expert opinion
as to whether the doctor or health care provider in question
breached his or her duty of care.5 The duty of care required is the
“degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances,
by members of the profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence.”6 The
panel does not make findings on damages, and litigants may still
proceed with bringing suit even if the panel determines there was
not a breach.7 The Act defines a “claimant” for medical review
panel purposes as “a patient or representative or any person, including a decedent’s estate, seeking or who has sought recovery of
damages or future medical care and related benefits.”8 When a
medical review panel claim is filed by a proper claimant, the prescriptive period for a medical malpractice claim is suspended during the full time the claim is pending before a medical review pan2. Guffey v. Lexington House, LLC, 283 So. 3d 1001 (La. 2019).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) (2019).
4. Houghton v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 859 So. 2d 103, 105106 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003).
5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(N)(6) (2019).
6. Id. at § 40:1231.1(A)(22).
7. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1012 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.8(A)(4) (2019).
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el and ninety days following notification to the claimant or her attorney of the panel’s opinion.9
In Guffey v. Lexington House, Geneva Guffey was an elderly
patient at Lexington House Nursing Home in Alexandra, Louisiana, who died on May 16, 2016.10 Her granddaughter, Deana Frederick, alleged that some months before her death, Ms. Guffey had
been dropped during a transfer from her bath chair to her bed,
causing injuries that eventually led to her death. Ms. Frederick
filed a complaint of medical malpractice and requested the formation of a medical review panel on November 2, 2016. Two of
Mrs. Guffey’s surviving sons, George Guffey and James Guffey,
who were the plaintiffs in the case before the Louisiana Supreme
Court, were added as claimants to the medical review panel on
May 18, 2017, more than one year after Mrs. Guffey’s death.11
On May 22, 2017, Lexington House filed an exception of no
right of action, asserting that Ms. Frederick was not a proper
claimant because she was not included in the class of persons entitled to recover damages for a wrongful death and survival action
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.2 and 2315.1, respectively.12 The trial court denied the exception, arguing that a “claimant”
for medical review panel purposes is not limited to those who will
ultimately be allowed to assert a survival or wrongful death claim
when the panel proceedings are concluded.13 The medical review
panel eventually held that Lexington breached its standard of care
since Mrs. Guffey should have been transported to her bath chair
by two people, but concluded that the laceration did not “exacerbate any of her chronic medical problems nor did it contribute to
her ultimate demise.”14
9. Id. at § 40:1231.8(A)(2)(a).
10. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1003.
11. Id.
12. Id. The first line of proper claimants under the articles are the decedent’s surviving spouse and children.
13. Id. at 1004.
14. Id.
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On January 28, 2018, within ninety days of the issuance of the
medical review panel opinion, James and George Guffey filed suit
on behalf of their mother, and Lexington filed an exception of prescription, alleging that the actions prescribed since neither brother
filed a malpractice claim within one year of the death of their
mother or discovery of the malpractice.15 The trial court denied the
exception of prescription, holding that Ms. Frederick was a proper
claimant because of her actual relationship with Ms. Guffey, and
that the timely filing of a claim for medical malpractice by one
claimant suspends prescription with regard to all other potential
claimants even if they were not named in the case.16 The appellate
court later affirmed, holding that Ms. Frederick was a proper
claimant as a succession representative and extending the holding
in Truxillo v. Thomas to allow suspension of the Guffey brothers’
suit due to Ms. Frederick’s medical review panel claim.17
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court, with Justice Guidry writing for
the majority, reversed the court of appeals’ ruling that Ms. Frederick was not a proper claimant for medical review panel purposes under the Act and held that prescription was thus not interrupted. The court reasoned that a proper medical review panel claimant under the Act must be someone “seeking or who has sought
recovery of damages or future medical care and related benefits
under this Part.”18 Thus, a claimant is only proper if he or she has
a right of action to claim wrongful death and survival damages
under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315.1 and 2315.2. Because
the proper party must be the decedent’s surviving spouse or children, Ms. Frederick did not fall into this class of persons, and,
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1005 (citing Truxillo v. Thomas, 200 So. 3d 972, 976 (La. App. 4
Cir 2016)).
17. Id. at 1006.
18. Id. at 1008.
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thus, her filing of the medical review panel did not interrupt prescription.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Johnson noted that Ms. Frederick
was a proper claimant under the statute because she was Mrs.
Guffey’s succession representative, had a valid power of attorney,
and was named executrix and sole beneficiary under Ms. Guffey’s
will.19 Additionally, the dissent distinguished a medical review
panel from a wrongful death action, holding that the medical review panel does not have the power to adjudicate the rights of parties.20 The dissent ultimately concluded that the statutory language
of the Act was broad enough to include Ms. Frederick, since the
claim could be brought by a patient or his or her representative,
with a “representative” including a legal agent of the patient,
which Ms. Frederick was through her power of attorney.21
IV. COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court’s holding in Guffey presents a problematic
precedent regarding both statutory interpretation and procedural
guidelines. It has long been an interpretative dogma that when a
law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no
further legislative interpretation shall be made.22 Ironically, when
the majority in this case held that the plaintiffs ignored the full
wording of the statute, the majority indeed committed the same
blunder themselves. Section 40:1231.1(A)(4) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, through its wording, essentially lists three main sets
of people allowed to file a medical review claim: the patient or
their representative or any person seeking damages/future medical
care benefits. While the statutory language and punctuation placement is indeed quite intricate, a reasonable reading of the statute
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1013 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2019).
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should be broad enough to include Ms. Frederick because, due to
her legal duty toward Mrs. Guffey, she could be qualified as a valid representative. Although Ms. Frederick is not in the first class of
plaintiffs to bring suit for wrongful death and survival, she is indeed a valid legal representative of Ms. Guffey and could be
deemed a proper claimant under the statute. Additionally, as a legal
representative and voice for Ms. Guffey, Ms. Frederick could also
satisfy the requirement of having a “real and actual interest”23 in
the action at hand. Although Ms. Frederick is not a proper party to
claim wrongful death and survival damages under the Act, her significant personal and legal relationship with Mrs. Guffey should
warrant her a proper party to at least file a claim to discover
whether the nursing home breached their duty, which ultimately
led to her grandmother’s demise.
The most detrimental consequence of the holding of this case is
the Supreme Court’s treatment of the medical review panel claim
as an extension of, rather than a supplement to, the medical malpractice action. While convening a medical review panel is certainly a prerequisite that must be met, the purposes and proceedings of
both actions should not warrant a similar holding in terms of proper parties. Even though a person may not have a legal right to collect wrongful death and survival actions, he or she should at least
be granted a courtesy in being allowed to investigate the cause of
their loved one’s death. Essentially, if Mrs. Guffey entrusted Ms.
Frederick enough to act as her legal representative and carry out
her estate, Ms. Frederick should, at a bare minimum, have a right
to find out what indeed happened to her grandmother.
Since the medical review panel is only a means rather than an
end to collect wrongful death damages, a proper claimant should
not be severely limited in this preceding procedure. Indeed, a medical review panel’s composition is made up of three health care
providers and one attorney, who does not vote and is purely there
23.

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 681 (2019).
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to advise the panel.24 Since the panel is not composed of legal experts designed to either award damages or render judgment in favor of either party, it seems strained to liken these two distinct proceedings and hold that only an actual party to the lawsuit can determine whether the doctors breached. Since the legislature allowed “agents” or “representatives” to initiate a claim under the
Act, the legislature intended to enable “agents” and “representatives” to protect the estate for those who may ultimately have a
right to file suit.25
While the majority in this case is correct in holding the Guffey
brothers are proper claimants under the statute, the court’s holding
severely limits and undermines the wording of the Medical Malpractice Act and confuses the steps of the litigation process. The
majority cites Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1231.8(B)(2)’s
language that a health care provider against whom a claim has
been filed may raise the peremptory exception of no right of action
at any time without the need for completion of the medical review
panel.26 Regarding the majority’s opinion, the legislature may not
have anticipated the situation, such as the one here, where a proper
medical review panel claimant is different from a proper medical
malpractice lawsuit plaintiff. However, the majority’s argument
here could be considered a bit reaching. One of the fundamental
principles of statutory interpretation is that when the language of a
law is susceptible of different meanings, the law must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the
law.27 As illustrated above, because the purpose of the medical review panel is to determine whether a doctor breached, rather than
to collect damages, Ms. Frederick should have been deemed a
proper claimant because a broader definition of “claimant” should
be allowed to determine breach rather than to collect damages.
24. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE—TORT
LAW § 15:5 (2d ed., West 2018).
25. Guffey, 283 So. 3d at 1009.
26. Id. at 1010.
27. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2019).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Guffey certainly
represented a landmark case as to the procedure for filing a medical review panel. While the majority does make strong arguments
of statutory interpretation with its holding, the dissent seemed to
have a better viewpoint in terms of policy considerations. The policy considerations emphasized by the dissent should outweigh the
strict, albeit problematic, textual interpretation of the majority. In
the holding, the court denies those with a legal duty to the patient
the right to file a review panel claim by limiting the definition of
“claimant” to essentially only a family member. While the majority
does present strong rationale as to its definitions, its holding could
indeed be a form of injustice to the Guffey’s that the Hippocratic
oath was meant to prevent.

